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Preface 
This paper is part of the «Nordic project Representative democracy, administrative 
reforms and EU-integration». It is a revised version of a paper prepared for presentation 
at the Workshop on The National Control of EU Public Policies, NOPSA Conference, 
Reykjavik August 11–13 2005. We wish to thank Ulf Sverdrup for valuable comments. 
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Summary 
This paper first describes the degree of EU regulation in the Nordic countries by 
focusing on the scope of EU rules and regulations in domestic administration, the 
monitoring and control, and the compliance and enforcement. Second, it analyzes the 
variation in regulation by using variables derived from a structural, a cultural, and an 
environmental perspective. The empirical database is surveys of all departments in 
ministries and central agencies in the five Nordic countries in 1998 and 2003. We show 
that the Nordic countries are highly integrated into the European regulatory system. 
There are significant variations between the areas of internal market and other policy 
areas, but also structural factors, such as administrative level, and cultural features, such 
as the Finish EU-eagerness make a difference. 
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet beskriver først omfanget av EU-regulering i de nordiske land ved å 
fokusere på innslaget av regler og reguleringer fra EU i nasjonal forvaltning og på 
iverksetting og kontroll og håndheving av regelverket. For det andre analyseres 
variasjonen i de ulike aspektene ved regulering ved å bruke variabler avledet fra 
strukturelle, kulturelle og omgivelsesperspektiver. Det empiriske grunnlaget er 
spørreskjemaundersøkelse til alle avdelinger i departementer og sentrale forvaltnings-
organer i de fem nordiske land i 1998 og 2003. Vi viser at de nordiske landene er sterkt 
integrerte i EUs regulerende system. Det er signifikante variasjoner mellom 
policyområder knyttet til det indre marked og andre sektorer. Men også strukturelle 
faktorer slik som forvaltningsnivå og kulturelle faktorer slik som den finske EU-
entusiasmen spiller en rolle. 
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Introduction 
This paper focuses on how the tasks and function of control and regulation in ministries 
and central agencies in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have changed 
as a result of increased integration into the EU. We ask what happens to the central 
government administration in the five small Nordic countries at the periphery of 
Europe when their regulatory systems to a greater extent become integrated into a 
broader European context (Olsen 1997). 
The Nordic countries represent a regional cluster scoring high on integration effects 
on the politics dimension and low on the polity dimension (Dyson and Goetz 2003). 
But there are also significant variations between the Nordic countries in how their 
polities adapt to increased European integration due to variations both in form of 
affiliation, length of membership, and depth of membership involvement (Jacobsson, 
Lægreid and Pedersen 2001, 2003). The regulatory pressure from the EU varies between 
different policy areas and administrative levels. Thus the scope and depth of EU-related 
regulatory activity might differ between the countries, but also between ministries and 
agencies and between policy areas. 
Regulation is an ambiguous concept that can be used both in a broad and in a narrow 
sense. According to Laffan (2001) regulation is a distinctive mode of governance infused 
with a specified logic, mechanisms and policy instruments. In the narrowest sense 
regulation means formulating authoritative sets of rules and setting up autonomous 
public agencies or other mechanisms for monitoring, scrutinizing, and promoting 
compliance with these rules. The focus here is primarily on such a narrow definition of 
regulation as a) goal formulation, rule-making, and standard setting; b) monitoring, 
information-gathering, scrutiny, inspection, audit, and evaluation; and c) enforcement, 
behaviour-modification, and the application of rewards and sanctions (Hood, Rothstein 
and Baldwin 2001). These functions may be carried out by a single organization or 
delegated separately to specialized agencies. Thus, the regulatory function may 
potentially involve a complex combination of vertical and horizontal inter-
organizational specialization of the central administrative apparatus (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2001). 
This paper sets out to do two things: 1) to describe the degree of EU regulation in 
the Nordic countries by focusing on the scope of EU rules and regulations in the 
domestic administration, the monitoring and control, and the compliance and 
enforcement; 2) to analyze the variation in regulation emphasising the importance of 
structural, cultural, and environmental features of the central government 
administration. Thus we primarily address the reception, or downloading, of EU 
regulation domestically by focusing on procedures, practices and activities developed to 
absorb the EU regulations into the daily work of central administrative bodies (Bulmer 
and Bursch 2005, Börzel 2002). Our focus is on polity features and how formal and 
informal regulatory structures, procedures and practices are affected by increased 
integration into a European regulatory system (Börzel and Risse 2003). 
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The data basis of this paper is a comparative survey undertaken in Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland, Norway and Iceland. Having one old member and two new members 
of the Union and two non-member states presents us with a unique possibility for a 
quasi-experimental design. By studying the five Nordic countries, we include small 
European countries that share a cultural and geographic region as well as many features 
of parliamentary government. They differ, however, in their formal relationship to the 
EU, their length of membership, the size of their administration, and the national 
context represented by the administrative tradition and strategy on EU integration.  
The survey comprises all ministerial departments as well as departments in central 
agencies and directorates. The survey was first conducted in 1998 and replicated in 
2003. We describe the response pattern by asking each individual department about its 
own experiences with EU/EEA cases. By using a standardized questionnaire with fixed 
response alternatives, the same questions were put to equivalent populations in the 
different countries in the two years. The survey forms were answered either by head of 
department, another person in senior position, an EU/EEA coordinator, or someone 
else in the unit with a reasonable knowledge of EU/EEA-related work. 
The respondents were asked to answer on behalf of the unit and not on behalf of 
themselves. A total of 1408 units in the five countries replied the questionnaire in 1998: 
370 in Denmark, 379 in Sweden, 258 in Finland, 331 in Norway, and 90 in Iceland. In 
2003 1321 unit responded: 343 in Denmark 262, 364 in Sweden, 212 in Finland, 262 in 
Norway and 140 in Iceland. In 1998 the response rate varied from 86 per cent in 
Norway to 72 per cent in Iceland. Five years later the response rate varied from 81 per 
cent in Sweden to 61 per cent in Finland. The three other countries had a response rate 
between 70 and 76 per cent. In this paper we have excluded 212 departments that 
reported that they are not affected at all by the EU/EEA agreement1. 
The dependent variables we will use in this paper are different dimensions of 
regulation, in line with the narrow definition of the term presented above. We will 
distinguish between rule making, rule implementation and monitoring, and rule 
enforcement. In considering rule making we will first examine the degree of changes in 
existing domestic rules and regulations or the introduction of new rules as a 
consequence of the EU/EEA over the past five years. Second, we ask if the EU/EEA 
work has implied changes in the arrangements for control and regulation within the 
unit’s area of responsibility. Third, we examine to what degree making and changing of 
laws, rules, regulations, directives and standards is a primary task in the departments. 
The implementation and monitoring variables are whether control, supervision, 
performance reporting, accounting, auditing and application of rewards and sanctions is 
a main emphasis of the section’s EU/EEA related work. Second, has the extent of 
control and regulation increased or decreased? Third, we ask how much of their 
workload has been related to implementation and enforcement of EU/EEA decisions 
and regulations. Fourth, we ask how much autonomy is experienced within the unit’s 
area of responsibility related to implementation of EU/EEA decisions and regulations.  
                                                 
1 For more information about the data set, see documentation from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services: 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/data/polsys/Index.cfm?Arkivnr=25&Institusjonsnummer=4&TypeTekst=80&Spraak=E
ng 
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Regarding enforcement of and compliance to rules and regulations we first ask if the 
European Commission or national authorities have investigated special EU-related cases 
in their area of work. Second, we ask to what degree the court system has been involved 
in regulation and control concerning EU/EEA related cases. To what degree have 
national courts and the European Court of Justice been involved? And who initiated the 
court procedure, EU bodies, national authorities, authorities in other countries, 
businesses, firms, or individuals?  
The outline of the paper is the following. First, we discuss the development towards 
a regulatory state, especially how EU can be seen as a regulatory state and the 
implications for the Nordic countries. Second, we present the three theoretical 
perspectives used and the hypotheses that we put forward, which are based on a 
blending of external pressure from the EU, an organizational structural perspective, as 
well as administrative culture and the importance of different administrative systems. 
Third, we present the empirical results, and finally, we discuss the findings and draw 
conclusions. 
Towards a regulatory state? 
The view is widespread that we live in the era of the Regulatory State (Majone 1994, 
1997, Loughlin and Scott 1997, McGowan and Wallace 1996, Moran 2002). The 
traditional sovereign state model with its command-and-control policy style, public 
ownership and nationalization is under pressure, despite its aims to reconcile a variety of 
partly conflicting goals in a multifunctional state. In contrast, the narrower goals of the 
Regulatory State are gaining support, namely to improve the efficiency of the economy, 
promote competition, and protect consumers and citizens. Other traditionally important 
considerations are de-emphasized.  
The Regulatory State tends to favour regulation over other means of policy-making. 
It is more a rule-making state than a taxing and spending state. Market regulation is 
more important than the redistribution of income and macro-economic stabilization 
(Majone 1997), the application of regulation is more formal, and privatization is a 
central feature (Levi-Faur and Gilad 2004). It involves a shift from direct to indirect 
government, and important policy-making powers are delegated to independent 
technocratic bodies with considerable political leeway. The state is kept at arm’s length 
from direct participation in the economy but has a well developed regulatory role 
(McGowan and Wallace 1996). In contrast to the traditional welfare-state model, which 
integrates regulatory, operating, and policy-making functions, the regulatory state 
separates regulatory activities from operational ones, purchasers from providers, and the 
policy-making role from the operational role. Greater emphasis is placed on single-
purpose organizations and monitoring by autonomous agencies (Boston et al. 1996). 
The regulatory state is, however, not a consistent concept.  
In spite of a clear trend towards regulatory policy convergence, national differences 
persist when it comes to institutional implementation of regulatory reforms. European 
regulatory pressure matters, but so do national administrative traditions (Barbieri 2004). 
The spread of the new regulatory paradigm has not lead to convergence in the 
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organizational design of regulatory agencies. Tenbücken and Schneider (2004) label this 
parallel process of stability and change «divergent convergence.» 
The trend towards a Regulatory State is stronger in some sectors and policy areas, 
such as utilities, than in others, like welfare, and there are great variations in how 
agencies operate, depending on what their primary task is (Pollitt et al. 2004). Variation 
also depends on the degree of regional integration, as exemplified by the European 
Union, and also on domestic political and administrative processes. How EU regulation 
is adopted in different countries depends on local political actors and processes 
(Kallestrup 2005). While European agencies may in general have less autonomy than 
American agencies and the system of public accountability may be less developed 
(Majone 1999), there are also big differences between how agencies function in different 
EU countries (Pollitt et al. 2004). 
For instance, in the Nordic welfare states, public ownership and nationalization were 
for a long time more popular policy tools than regulation. There is, however, also a long 
tradition of strong, autonomous agencies being responsible for policy implementation 
and service delivery. In Sweden one concern is that the capacity of ministries to control 
and monitor the big and powerful agencies is weak (Molander et al. 2002), even though 
it can be argued that the cabinet has other, more general means of control that can 
counteract the formal autonomy of the agencies (Lindbom 1997). Politicians might use 
informal channels to influence the decision-making of agencies, thus undermining their 
formal autonomy. In Denmark, Norway and Iceland the directors of the agencies are 
politically accountable to the ministries through the principle of ministerial 
responsibility, but there are regulatory reforms underway which might increase their 
autonomy (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b). Generally contextual factors such as state 
traditions, structures and reforms, as well as political leadership, make a difference 
(Thatcher 2002). 
EU as  a  regulatory  state  
An important factor for understanding the rise of the Regulatory State in Europe is 
greater European integration by stealth and the emergence of the EU as a regulatory 
body focusing on competition and the development of a free internal market (Majone 
1994, 1999, 2005). Labelling the European Union a regulatory state can also be related 
to the importance of rule setting as source of legitimacy, because it lacks many other 
sources of traditional power (Laffan 2001). Inspired by the American model, the 
European Regulatory State has both an ideological and instrumental background and 
culturally represents a new direction for many European countries. 
Regulation is the most important type of policy-making in the EU and in the last 
decade the EU itself has been the subject of a variety of regulatory reforms affecting 
both its own regulatory regime and the member states (Armstrong 2000, Everson et al. 
1999). Quite a few independent regulatory agencies have been established (Flinders 
2004, Groenler, Boin and Kuipers 2005). One difference between regulatory bodies at 
the national and the European level is that the latter also focus on regulation of the 
regulators (McGowan and Wallace 1996, Zeiner 2003). The creation of the single 
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European market required the liberalization of the utilities sectors, the abolition of 
national monopolies, and the establishment of independent regulatory agencies in the 
member states to promote competition. EU has set up rather specific guidelines for 
regulatory agencies in transport, communication and food safety (Egeberg 2005a). Thus 
the EU, as a new actor in regulation, has affected the European regulatory style.  
A comparative study of Britain, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden reveals a general shift 
towards the Regulatory State, but at the same time it is difficult to discern a convergence 
towards a single and identical regulatory approach in the different countries (Lodge 
2001). A similar conclusion comes from a study of the UK, France, Spain, and 
Germany, which shows that different domestic institutional constellations, such as the 
degree of fragmentation, hierarchy, and policy overlap, tend to create their own logic 
and dynamic in the process of regulatory reform (Jordana and Sancho 2004). Domestic 
institutions and traditions represent «filters» producing different outcomes in different 
countries, as illustrated by Busch (2002) with respect to the regulation of the banking 
sector. Thus, there is limited evidence of the emergence of one regulatory state. 
The EU depends on domestic institutions to implement its rules and regulations, but 
there is an increased attention in the EU towards proper application of existing rules 
(Sverdrup 2004). There is also a growing literature on the implementation of EU 
regulations in domestic administrations and member countries, focusing on the 
transposition of EU rules into national legislation and adhering to, complying with, and 
enforcing them in the different member countries (Bursens 2002, Börzel 2002, Falkner 
et al. 2004, Sverdrup 2004, 2005, Tallberg 2002). Central issues are variations in 
implementation performance, the politics of implementation, the processes of 
implementation and the outcome. In this paper we will primarily address the question of 
implementation performance and how and to what extent the Nordic states are being 
affected by increased European regulation.  
The Nordic  states  and EU regulat ion 
As pointed out in the introduction, this paper sets out to describe and discuss the degree 
of EU regulation in the Nordic countries and to analyse the variation in the regulation 
between the countries. A common feature of the Nordic countries is an incremental, 
pragmatic and consensus oriented model of governance based on high level of mutual 
trust in which the courts play a less important role than in many other European 
countries. 
Despite the evidence that the Nordic countries are among the best performing 
countries when it comes to transposing EU directives (Sverdrup 2004) and 
implementation of EU rules and regulations (Börzel 2002, Sverdrup 2002), there are 
variations in their regulatory policies and practices because the Nordic countries have 
not followed the same adoption pattern to the EU and their form of affiliation differs. 
Denmark became a member of the European Union already in 1973, while Sweden and 
Finland joined in 1995. The relationship of Iceland and Norway with the EU is 
governed by the agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) dating from 1994. 
The EEA agreement is linked to pillar one in the EU-cooperation and facilitates an 
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internal market between EEA countries and the EU, ensuring the free movement of 
capital, people, goods, and services. At the same time, the EEA agreement goes beyond 
the free trade area and paves the way for participation in other areas, such as 
environmental protection, statistics, education, research, consumers’ affairs, social 
issues, and technological development.  
As a consequence of the EEA agreement, Icelandic and Norwegian legislation has to 
be aligned with the EU legislation in a number of areas to ensure a congruent legal 
framework. Thus they have to incorporate all EU legislation of relevance to the market 
project (Egeberg 2005a). However, there is some uncertainty about how much of EU 
legislation the EFTA/EEA states have incorporated into their law2.  
Norway and Iceland have access to the preparatory committees under the 
Commission but not to other decision making processes of the EU, such as the Council 
of Ministers, the European Parliament and the European Council. Despite long 
membership the Danes have been among the most sceptical of further integration of 
the EU. They are not a member of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 
common defence policy, nor the institutionalization of European citizenship. Neither is 
Sweden part of the EMU. Among the five Nordic states, Finland turns out as the most 
integrated state, being the only Nordic state not to have any exceptions from the 
European project.  
 Summing up, there are big differences between the member countries and the non-
member countries when it comes to participating in the rule-making process in the EU, 
but similarities when it comes to the transposition of the EU rules domestically, 
especially when it comes to the area of the internal market. One difference is though 
that the member countries cover a broader scope of policy areas than the non-members. 
The responsibility for implementing the EU rules is also similar for member countries 
and EEA-countries.  
In order to understand the degree of EU regulation in the Nordic countries it is 
obvious that an enforcement perspective has to be used because the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice hold the competencies for monitoring 
and sanctioning non compliance in the EU countries. In EFTA these competencies are 
delegated to the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. But this 
perspective alone does not enable us to account for the variation in the adoption and 
practice of regulation. It is necessary to look at the functions of control and regulation 
from a much broader view.  
Understanding EU-regulation in the 
Nordic countries 
In order to provide an understanding of the EU regulation in the Nordic countries we 
will distinguish between three perspectives: a structural-instrumental approach, a 
                                                 
2 See Norwegian parliamentary readings Dokument no. 15 (2003–2004), Question no. 15 (2003–2004), and also, 
http://www.mbl.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein.html 
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cultural-institutional approach, and an environmental approach, which stresses the 
importance of external pressure (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2005). The first 
perspective emphasizes the formal organizational structure, and we would thus expect 
to find a close link between formal structure and how the organizations adapt in 
regulatory issues. By contrast, the institutional perspective would attribute variations in 
regulatory behaviour in different administrative cultures and traditions. The external 
pressure, emphasized by the environmental approach, is primarily related to pressure 
from the EU. We will now present these perspectives in some detail and accordingly 
derive the hypotheses from them that we will use in our efforts to explain the degree 
and the variation of the EU-related regulatory activities in the Nordic countries. 
A structura l - instrumental  perspect ive  
A main feature of many organizational approaches is the concept of bounded rationality 
(March and Simon 1958), which implies that decision-makers have limited time and 
attention and cannot address all goals, all alternatives, and all consequences. They face 
problems of capacity and understanding and have to make some selections. The formal 
organizational structure represents one important selection mechanism. Formal 
structures and procedures organize some actors, cleavages, problems, and solutions into 
decision-making processes in the public sector, while others are excluded.  
Gulick’s (1937) argues that there is a rather close connection between the formal 
structure chosen and the practice within and between organizations, underlining that the 
way formal authority is distributed among hierarchical levels is important for regulatory 
practice. Decision-makers act on behalf of formal organizations. A structural-
instrumental approach presumes that one has to study how the public sector is 
organized in order to understand how it works.  
According to this perspective formal structure matters, but it is not the only 
organizational feature that may be instrumentally designed. It is not enough to focus on 
the narrow internal organizational structure of the civil service; also their external 
organization may play an important role in their behaviour. Based on this general 
perspective we will adopt three structural variables: form of affiliation to the EU, 
administrative level, and administrative size. Form of affiliation represents the external 
organization, and we will distinguish between member countries (Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland) and EEA members (Iceland and Norway). This might be labelled a 
participation model: There are significant differences between member states and non 
members. The first group of countries have full participation in the regulatory decision 
making process while EEA countries only have a consulting role in the preparation 
phase. The EEA countries have to adopt the EU regulations concerning the internal 
market but are more loosely coupled to other policy areas. Adding to this the EU has 
more capabilities, longer traditions, and stronger enforcement capacity than the EFTA 
(Sverdrup 2004). Thus our first hypothesis (H1) is that member countries will be more 
integrated into the regulatory activities of the EU than EEA countries. 
Administrative level refers to the internal organization of the civil service. A major 
distinction in the Nordic central administration is between ministries and central 
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agencies (directorates). The main idea is that ministries should give priorities to policy 
advice and planning, but also rule-making, while the primary tasks of agencies are policy 
implementation and monitoring. The different regulatory functions are split between 
different administrative levels, but there is also a general trend to delegate more 
regulatory activities to agencies Thus our second hypothesis (H2) is that regulatory 
activities are more common in agencies than in ministries, especially when it comes to 
monitoring.    
Furthermore, according to the importance of administrative capacity we develop the 
third structural variable: size of administration. There is a considerable difference in the size 
of central administrations, in terms of number of employees in the member states of the 
EEA. For instance, there is a direct connection between number of inhabitants in the 
EEA member states and the number of people employed in their Foreign Services 
(Thorhallsson 2002). In the case of the Nordic states there is a considerable difference 
in the size of the central administrations in Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway, on 
the one hand, and in the size of the central administration in Iceland on the other. Thus, 
one could assume that the small size of the Icelandic administration affects its capacity 
and how it adapts in regulatory issues and distinguish it from the other Nordic 
administrations (Lægreid, Steinthorsson and Thorhallsson 2004). Accordingly, our third 
hypothesis (H3) states that Iceland has greater difficulties in adapting to EEA regulatory 
issues than the other Nordic states because of its limited capacity. 
A cul tura l - inst i tut ional  perspect ive  
A second set of factors concerns the historical and cultural traditions of political-
administrative systems (Selznick 1957). In institutional approaches informal norms, 
identities, and the logic of appropriateness are more important than interests and 
intentions and the logic of consequentiality (March and Olsen 1989). The point of 
departure is that a certain style of controlling agencies has developed over time. Norms 
and values within agencies and central government and internal dynamics are important. 
Path dependencies constrain what is appropriate and possible to move to agency status 
and how the agencies will operate. The reform road taken reflects the main features of 
national institutional processes, where institutional «roots» determine the path followed 
(Krasner 1988). Change is characterized by historical inefficiency and incrementalism. 
What happens in one country’s administration is not a blueprint for developments in 
other administrations. Regulatory activities reinforce underlying distinctive national 
trajectories and historical legacies, and the effects of formal structure are mediated and 
constrained by contextual factors (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). Administrative 
traditions represent ‘filters’ producing different outcomes in different countries. 
We will distinguish between an east Nordic administrative culture and a west Nordic 
administrative culture (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2001, 2003). The eastern Nordic 
dualistic model finds clearest expression in the Swedish national administration. The 
roots of this administrative model are usually traced back to the 1770s. A clear 
distinction is made between the government and its offices on the one hand and the 
central agencies on the other hand. The agencies are formally autonomous of the 
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individual ministers but are subordinated to the government as a whole. Traditionally 
Finland has been placed in the east Nordic model, but recent changes have weakened 
this link. The west Nordic model finds its expression in Denmark, Norway and Iceland. 
In this monistic model ministries are formally responsible for their subordinate agencies 
based on the principle for ministerial responsibility. A minister can be held accountable 
by parliament for all the decisions made by the administration. The roots for this model 
can be found in the area in which absolute monarchy was introduced in 1660. One 
possible consequence of this difference between the east and west Nordic administrative 
tradition is that the adaptation to EU regulations will be easier in the more integrated 
west Nordic model than in the east Nordic model with stronger and more independent 
central agencies. The west Nordic Model is in many ways more compatible with the 
European polity style. Thus our fourth hypothesis (H4) is that the regulatory activity will 
be more extended in Denmark, Norway, and Iceland than in Sweden and Finland. 
Moreover, administrative norms and values in terms of willingness to adapt to new 
traditions and to implement the bulk of regulations may have profound influence on 
success or failure of particular regulations. One cannot escape from the historical facts 
that the Nordic states have been more reluctant to participate in the European 
integration process than states on the Continent (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 
2001, Egeberg 2005a). On the other hand, leading politicians at present in the Nordic 
states, except in the case of Iceland, tend to be pro-European and to favour greater 
participation in European integration but are held back by a considerably numerous 
Euro-sceptical electorate. As a result, Finland is the only Nordic state to take a full and 
an active part in all aspects of the European integration process. Our concern is to what 
extent Euro-scepticism in the Nordic states has influenced the central administrations´ 
willingness to adopt EU/EEA regulatory issues. In other words, political and administrative 
engagement in European integration may affect central administrations´ responses to 
EU/EEA regulatory issues. Thus, our fifth hypothesis (H5) is that the central 
administrations of the partial engagement countries, Iceland, Norway, Denmark and 
Sweden are more reluctant to adopt EU/EEA regulatory issues than the pro-European 
Finland.  
External  pressure f rom the EU 
A third set of factors describes the autonomy and control of agencies primarily as a 
response to external pressure from the EU. Seen form this perspective, development 
within the EU plays a decisive role for what happens in the national administration. The 
development of the EU, its aspirations and its dynamics together with its ideas and 
regulations explain the actions of the national administration. We will distinguish 
between three variables: Policy area, time, and experience (length of membership). First, the 
pressure from the EU as a regulatory body varies between policy areas. It started and is 
strongest in EU’s core, related to the four freedoms; free movement of people, capital, 
goods, and services; the internal market, and utilities sectors. Competition policy was the 
first ‘supranational’ policy in the EU (McGowan and Wilkes 1995). This might be 
labelled a competence model: Policy area matters. The regulatory pressure will be 
WORKING PAPER  10  –  2005 EUROPEANIZATION  OF  NORDIC  CENTRAL  GOVERNMENTS:  … 
16 
stronger in the area of economic regulation (internal market) than in welfare state areas 
(soft regulation). Thus our sixth hypothesis (H6) is that the regulatory activities are more 
extended within the economic market oriented industry and business areas than in the 
soft welfare state sectors, like health or education, and in security and defence issues 
where decisions are still dominated by domestic decision-makers.  
Second, we will expect that time make a difference. The EU is a dynamic organization 
and the integration process has acquired a new pace in the last five years, representing a 
stronger regulatory pressure in 2003 than in 1999. Over time the EU bodies develop 
improved methods for controlling compliance and improving their skills and capacities. 
Based on such an enforcement model, time matters. There will be increasing 
enforcement power over time due to increased integration. 1998 differs from 2003. 
Thus our seventh hypothesis is that the regulatory activities (H7) are more extensive in 
2003 than in 1998. 
We might also add an experience model: Length of membership matters. As shown 
in earlier studies (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2001, 2003) Denmark with more 
than 20 years longer membership in EU than Sweden and Finland and also the EEA 
countries has much more experience with handling EU-related matters. Denmark is a 
transposition leader in the EU (Bursens 2002). In the period 1997–2004 Denmark had 
the lowest transposition deficit of the EU member states (Sverdrup 2005). Thus, 
European matters have to a greater extent become an integrated part of the daily work 
in ministries and central agencies in Denmark. Thus our eighth hypothesis (H8) is that 
Danish units will generally report less EU-related regulatory activity due to their 
experience and that the EEA partners and the other countries, due to the newness as 
members, will report a stronger EU-related regulatory activity. Especially we expect that 
Denmark will score low on rule enforcement. 
Blending the perspect ives  
We will argue that environmental, cultural, and structural contexts constitute 
transformative preconditions and constraints that in a complex and dynamic way affect 
the trade-off between autonomy and control (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Jacobsson. 
Lægreid and Pedersen 2001, 2003). Cultural factors can modify the effects of formal 
structure, but cultural factors can also support the regulatory activities and make the 
effects even stronger. In the same way, external forces by a competitive market may be 
enhanced or tempered by structural features or administrative culture and tradition 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2004a). A main presumption is that formal organizational 
structures constrain organizational behaviour, but also that regulatory activities cannot 
be traced to one single factor such as formal structure. The type of formal structure is 
normally a broad category, which gives some direction but also allows a great variety of 
actual behaviour.  
Summing up, the complexity of the context matters and the regulatory activities are 
the result of a blend of external pressure, path dependencies, and structural constraints 
(Olsen 1992, Pollitt et al. 2004). Instead of assuming that form of affiliation determines 
the regulatory activities in domestic administrations, that it is totally determined by 
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external pressure from the EU, we will argue that we have to combine these features to 
understand the scope, level, and variation of regulatory activities.  
EU-regulations in domestic 
administration. Bivariate analyses 
The first question that we would like to cover in our review of the empirical material is 
to what extent the units are applying EU-regulations among the different dimensions of 
rule making, rule implementation and monitoring, and rule enforcement. The second is 
how the scores on the different independent variables, i.e. our indicators of structural, 
cultural and EU pressure, correlate with the different regulatory features, by focusing on 
the bivariate relations between each set of variables and the different regulatory 
dimensions. To describe and explain the degree and variation of different regulatory 
features we will primarily use cross tables, bivariate correlations of all relevant 
relationships, (summed up by Pearson’s r). 
Rule-making 
Nearly half of the departments that have been affected by the EU/EEA agreement state 
that they have rule making as a primary task, as shown in table 1. Departments dealing 
with regulations on the internal market are more likely to have rule making as a primary 
task than departments dealing with other policy areas. Table 1 also shows that 1 out of 4 
departments has introduced new procedures for control and auditing because of 
EU/EEA work. Departments dealing with regulations concerning the internal market 
have to a greater extent adopted new procedures than departments dealing with other 
sectors. This is also the case of Finland compared with the other states. Moreover, 
agencies are more likely to have introduced new procedures for control and auditing 
than ministries. One of findings is that there was not a greater pressure for increased 
control and auditing in the period 1999 to 2003 compared to the previous period (1995–
1998) despite increased speed of integration within the EU. 
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Table 1. Has the EU/EEA work during the last five years implied new procedures for control and 
auditing and is rule making a primary task? Percentage. Pearson’s r. N=2517 
 Rule making as a 
primary task 
Sign. New procedures for control 
and audit 
Sign. 
Country: 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Iceland 
Total 
 
Administrative level: 
Ministry 
Agency 
 
Year: 
1998 
2003 
 
Policy area: 
Internal market  
Other 
 
42 
44 
49 
46 
55 
46 
 
 
51 
44 
 
 
46 
46 
 
 
53 
37 
 
 
 
 
Icel.:-.05* 
Denm. .04* 
 
 
 
 
-.06** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
..16** 
 
17 
25 
41 
20 
21 
24 
 
 
20 
26 
 
 
24 
24 
 
 
29 
18 
 
 
 
 
M: -.07** 
E/W: -.15** 
Finl.: -.18** 
 
 
 
.07** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.13** 
**: Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level 
Table 2 indicates several interesting findings. First, it shows that nearly half of the 
departments state that there have been large changes in existing rules and regulations or 
many new rules introduced in their field of work during the past five years. Only one 
out of ten departments states that there have been no changes in existing rules and 
regulation or no introduction of new rules. Second, more than half of departments 
dealing with regulations related to the internal market have introduced new rules or 
made significant changes to their original procedures while only one third of 
departments concerned with other policy sectors have introduced new rules or made 
considerable changes to their rules.  
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Table 2. To what extent have there during the last five years been changes in existing rules and 
regulations or introduction of new rules in the department’s filed of work as a consequence of 
EU/EEA? Percentage. Pearson’s r. N=2203 
 Very large extent Large 
extent 
Small 
extent 
Very small 
extent 
None Sign. 
Country: 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Iceland 
Total 
 
Administrative level: 
Ministry 
Agency 
 
Year: 
1998 
2003 
 
Policy area: 
Internal market 
Other 
 
15 
16 
24 
15 
24 
15 
 
 
11 
19 
 
 
11 
19 
 
 
18 
11 
 
33 
26 
33 
28 
33 
29 
 
 
31 
28 
 
 
31 
28 
 
 
35 
22 
 
28 
27 
20 
25 
20 
27 
 
 
28 
26 
 
 
29 
25 
 
 
25 
29 
 
18 
18 
15 
21 
15 
18 
 
 
16 
19 
 
 
17 
20 
 
 
15 
23 
 
6 
12 
8 
11 
8 
11 
 
 
10 
11 
 
 
12 
9 
 
 
7 
15 
 
 
 
 
I.:.07** 
F:.06** 
D:-.05* 
 
 
 
-.04* 
 
 
 
-.08** 
 
 
 
.22** 
**: Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level 
Moreover, table 1 demonstrates that there is a stronger regulation pressure in 2003 than 
in 1998. The central administrations in Finland and Iceland have introduced more new 
rules or changed their original rules to a greater extent than the other three 
administrations. 
Our data supports the conception that rulemaking and regulation is important in 
Europeanization (Laffan 2001), especially in relation to the internal market. The 
increased intensity of the rulemaking activity is evident but moderate in departments 
dealing with regulatory activities. On the other hand the pressure on departments 
regarding control and auditing is not greater compared over time. According to 
Sverdrup (2004), who reports a diverging development between the European countries 
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in the ways they handle conflicts, the Nordic countries seek to resolve conflicts by 
consensus. It is important to view the above information in the light of that.  
Monitor ing 
Only 13 per cent of the departments report that monitoring, overseeing and control has 
been a primary task in the last five years, according to table 3. Thus, monitoring is a less 
extensive task than rule making. On the other hand, the extent of control and auditing 
has increased in one out of every four departments. Policy areas belonging to the 
internal market are significantly more affected than other sectors. Nearly half of 
departments in Finland have experienced increased control, while Denmark, being an 
early EU member state, has considerable less increase in control and audit than the 
others. Iceland is also an interesting case in this respect, scoring high on increase in the 
extent of control and auditing. Interestingly, form of affiliation does not have much 
impact. Table 3 also shows that agencies tend to have monitoring as their primary task 
to a greater extent than ministries do. They have also experienced greater control and 
audit than ministries in the last few years. Additionally, time (1998 versus 2003) is not a 
distinctive factor in this respect.  
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Table 3. Monitoring as primary task of the department’s EU’EEA related work and increased control 
and audit of EU/EEA related work. Percentage. Pearson’s r. N=2517 
 Monitoring, overseeing and 
control as primary task 
during the last year 
Sign. The extent of control and 
audit has increased during the 
last five years 
Sign. 
Country: 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Iceland 
Total 
 
Administrative level: 
Ministry 
Agency 
 
Year: 
1998 
2003 
 
Policy area: 
Internal market 
Other 
 
12 
15 
15 
10 
12 
13 
 
 
9 
15 
 
 
12 
15 
 
 
17 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
M: -.05* 
E/W: -.06** 
 
 
 
.07** 
 
 
 
.04* 
 
 
 
-.13** 
 
14 
21 
47 
20 
37 
25 
 
 
21 
27 
 
 
25 
26 
 
 
31 
18 
 
 
 
E/W: -.13** 
Finl.:-.24** 
Isl.:-.08** 
Denm.:.10** 
 
 
 
.06** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.15** 
**: Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level 
Table 4 shows that nearly 2 out of every 10 departments that have been affected by 
EU/EEA report that a large part of their workload has been related to implementation 
and enforcement of European issues in the past year. EU member states experience 
slightly more workload than Iceland and Norway. On the other hand, departments in 
Finland and Sweden have more workload than departments in Denmark. Table 4 also 
shows that ministries have more workload related to EU/EEA cases than agencies 
while there is not a significant difference in the workload of departments dealing with 
regulations concerning the internal market versus departments dealing with other policy 
areas. 
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Table 4. How large has the department’s workload related to implementation and enforcement of 
EU/EEA decisions and regulations been during the past year? Percentage. Pearson’s r. N=1044 
 Large  Some Small/None Sign. 
Country: 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Iceland 
Total 
 
Administrative level: 
Ministry 
Agency 
 
Policy area: 
Internal market 
Other 
 
17 
24 
17 
15 
14 
18 
 
 
28 
15 
 
 
19 
18 
 
20 
22 
34 
21 
31 
25 
 
 
32 
22 
 
 
27 
22 
 
63 
53 
50 
64 
55 
57 
 
 
41 
63 
 
 
55 
60 
 
 
 
 
Member. .07* 
East/West: .10** 
Denmark: -.05* 
 
 
 
.20** 
 
 
 
 
**: Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level 
Table 5 indicates no significant difference between the experiences of the Nordic states 
in terms of freedom related to implementation of EU/EEA issues, despite the fact that 
only three of them are members of the EU. Nearly two-thirds of departments 
experience none-to-small degree of freedom. However, departments dealing with 
internal market regulations experience less freedom than departments working within 
other policy sectors, i.e. 70 percent of them experiencing small to none freedom 
compared to 59 percent of departments dealing with other policy areas. Also, agencies 
have less manoeuvrability than ministries.  
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Table 5. What degree of freedom is experienced within the department’s area of responsibility related to 
implementation of EU/EEA decisions and regulations? Percentage. Pearson’s r. N=977 
 Very large  Large  Small Very small  None Sign. 
Country: 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Iceland 
Total 
 
Administrative level: 
Ministry 
Agency 
 
Policy area: 
Internal market 
Other 
 
9 
8 
8 
10 
7 
9 
 
 
9 
8 
 
 
5 
12 
 
22 
26 
32 
27 
29 
27 
 
 
29 
26 
 
 
25 
30 
 
42 
32 
33 
32 
33 
34 
 
 
41 
32 
 
 
38 
30 
 
17 
19 
21 
21 
21 
20 
 
 
15 
22 
 
 
22 
18 
 
10 
15 
6 
10 
10 
11 
 
 
6 
12 
 
 
10 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.09** 
 
 
 
-.10** 
**: Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level 
Formally it seems that the development in the Nordic countries is more on a way to a 
hierarchical regulation and control system accompanied by agencification (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2005). The focus is towards implementation of the regulation which 
resonates with Sverdrup (2004), that all states have reduced their implementation deficit. 
The importance of monitoring seems increasing and the respondents reveal little 
freedom of interpretation in the implementation. Nevertheless the information that 
monitoring in the Nordic countries is a less extensive task than rulemaking indicates that 
resolution of implementation and enforcement issues is more informal and pragmatic 
than formal and ideological, a characteristic of the Nordic countries that has been 
pointed out by Lægreid and Pedersen (1994), Christensen, Lægreid et al. (2002) and 
Sverdrup (2004).  
Enforcement/compl iance 
Nearly 20 percent of departments have been subject to control from EU/EEA 
authorities in the last year reported, as table 6 illustrates. Denmark stands out as only 8 
percent of its departments have been controlled, compared to around 30 percent of 
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departments in Iceland, Norway, and Finland. Interestingly, ESA has executed control 
over Iceland and Norway more often than EU regulatory agencies have over Sweden 
and Denmark. Table 6 also reveals that EU related control to a greater extent comes 
form EU/EEA bodies than form national regulatory agencies. EU/EEA authorities and 
national regulatory agencies both tend to be more concerned with regulations on the 
internal market than regulations and decisions belonging to other policy areas. Nearly 
one out of every four departments in Finland has been controlled by national regulatory 
agencies while only 2 percent of Danish departments have the same experience. Finland 
and Sweden, belonging to the East Nordic Model, are more likely to have had control 
executed by domestic regulatory agencies than states in the West Nordic Model. There 
is no difference in the execution of ministries and agencies.  
Table 6. Has EU related control within the department’s area of work been executed in the past year 
from EU authorities or from national authorities? Percentage. Pearson’s r. N=2525 
 By the EU Commission, EU 
regulatory agencies or ESA 
Sign. By national 
regulatory 
agencies 
Sign. 
Country: 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Iceland 
Total 
 
Administrative level: 
Ministry 
Agency 
 
Policy area: 
Internal market 
Other 
 
8 
22 
30 
29 
32 
19 
 
 
21 
19 
 
 
26 
11 
 
 
Memb: .15** 
E/W: -.11** 
Finl:-.11** 
Isl.:-.09** 
Denm.:.24** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.19** 
 
2 
14 
23 
6 
4 
8 
 
 
9 
8 
 
 
11 
6 
 
 
 
Memb: -.06* 
E/W: -.25** 
Finl.: -.22** 
Denm. .19** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.09** 
**: Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level 
Table 7 shows that 22 and 25 percent of departments answering this question have 
referred to knowledge of cases within their sections area of work brought in front of 
National Courts and the European Court of Justice. All in all 200 departments in the 
five countries report knowledge of cases brought before national courts and 224 report 
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cases for the EU-courts. The number of actual cases is significant lower than this 
reported number (Sverdrup 2004). This is partly because the same case normally covers 
several departments in ministries and agencies and because the respondents might 
report both cases that have been solved at the preparatory stages of the court process as 
well as those cases that has gone all the way through the court system. Sweden scores 
highest in the case of having to face the EU court and of the EU member states Sweden 
and Finland (East Nordic Model) have more often had their cases presented to national 
courts than Denmark. On the other hand, there is not a significant difference in how 
often the EU member states have been brought to court compared to the EU outsiders, 
Iceland and Norway. In other words, Iceland and Norway, interestingly, seem to be as 
accountable to national and EU/EEA courts concerning European regulations as EU 
member states. The cases brought before courts are, not surprisingly, more likely to 
regard the internal market than regulations in other policy sector. Ministries, which have 
greater jurisdiction than individual agencies, are more likely to experience ‘the Court 
room’ both at the national and the European level than their agencies.  
WORKING PAPER  10  –  2005 EUROPEANIZATION  OF  NORDIC  CENTRAL  GOVERNMENTS:  … 
26 
Table 7. Has there within the department’s area of work during the past five years been presented 
EU/EEA related cases to national courts or EU-courts? Percentage. Pearson’s r 
 National courts (N=910) EF-court(s) (N=977) 
 Several 
cases 
One case No Several 
cases 
One 
case 
No 
Country: 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Iceland 
Total 
Significance (Pearson’s r) 
National courts: East/West: .09** 
EF-Courts:: Finland: -.08* 
 
Administrative level: 
Ministry 
Agency 
Significance (Pearson’s r) 
National courts.11** 
EF-courts: .19** 
 
Policy area: 
Internal market 
Other 
Significance (Pearson’s r): 
National Courts .09** 
EU Courts of Justice .07* 
 
14 
23 
13 
10 
9 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
13 
 
2 
3 
9 
8 
17 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
4 
 
84 
74 
78 
81 
74 
78 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
81 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
83 
 
17 
20 
7 
18 
5 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
14 
 
4 
10 
12 
5 
15 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
6 
 
79 
70 
80 
76 
80 
76 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
81 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
80 
**: Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level 
The European institutions can initiate investigations on the basis of complaints-cases or 
own initiative (Sverdrup 2002). The agencies report that cases are primarily brought to 
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courts by EU bodies (35%) and firms (31%), but in quite a few cases also by individuals 
(27%). National authorities and national courts also take the initiative in some cases. In 
Sweden initiatives to bring EU cases to court normally come from firms, EU bodies, 
national courts and individuals. In Finland and Denmark EU bodies are the main actors, 
while individuals and firms are more active in Iceland. The latter is also the case for 
Norway, but EU bodies also take some initiatives against Norwegian units. Ministries 
report more initiatives from EU bodies and from individuals than central agencies. 
Individuals are also more active in policy areas outside the internal market. 
The fact that Norway and Iceland have been more often controlled by ESA than 
Sweden and Denmark have been controlled by EU regulatory agencies seems to be of 
some support for the statement that ESA is «more catholic than the Pope» (Sverdrup 
and Graver 2002). Also, of some interest in this regard are the findings reported by 
Sverdrup (2002) that the majority of the cases taken up by ESA are by their own 
initiative. The situation reported by the agencies when it comes to EU/EEA related 
cases presented to national courts and EF-courts is that more than 50 percent of the 
cases are a result of external complaints and initiatives. There seems to be a sceptical but 
obedient adoption of EU rules and laws by the Nordic authorities (Lægreid 2001). 
Also worth mentioning is that the issues taken up by the enforcement agencies are 
most of the time related to the internal market which suggests that the regulation in 
both the EU and in the Nordic countries is more often concerned with ensuring 
competition and free trade. 
Structure, culture, or pressure from the 
EU? Multivariate analyses 
The main question in this section is to examine the relative importance of the various 
independent variables for the different regulatory features. This is done by multivariate 
analysis. We will discuss the findings in relation to the perspectives and hypotheses 
derived from them by using multivariate analyses of independent variables having 
significant bivariate correlations summed up by standardized Beta coefficients in linear 
regressions.  
Structure  
The first perspective emphasized the formal organizational structure. Three structural 
variables were adopted: external level, i.e. form of affiliation to the EU; internal level, i.e. 
ministries versus agencies; size of administration, i.e. Iceland versus others. We assumed, 
according to these variables that: the EU member states would be more integrated into 
the regulatory activities of the EU than Iceland and Norway; regulatory activities were 
more common in agencies than in ministries; the small size of the Icelandic 
administration affected how it adapted in regulatory issues. 
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Interestingly, at the external level the EU member states are experiencing more 
pressures than Norway and Iceland in only two of our cases, i.e. they experience 
considerably more control from the Commission and more workload concerning 
implementing rules, as tables 8 and 9 show. As a result, form of affiliation makes a 
difference (H1) but it is not as decisive a matter as one could expect (Jacobsson, 
Lægreid and Pedersen 2003). For instance, form of affiliation does not seem to effect 
changes in existing rules and regulation or introduction of new rules; new procedure for 
control and audit; rule making or monitoring as primary task; freedom experienced 
concerning implementation.  
At the internal level, administration level (ministries/agencies) makes a difference in 
all of our cases, except for two, though not a considerable one. The most noticeable 
difference is that ministries experience more workload related to the implementation 
process than agencies do, and ministries have more often experienced having cases 
within their area of work brought to EU and national courts than agencies have which 
may not come as a surprise because of their greater jurisdictions. In addition, for 
instance, the data indicate that ministries have slightly more freedom of manoeuvre than 
agencies and they are a bit more likely to have rule making as a primary task compared 
to agencies. Also, ministries are somewhat more likely to have experienced changes in 
existing rules and regulations or introduction of new rules than agencies, as tables 8 and 
9 illustrate. On the other hand, ministries and agencies seem to be under similar 
pressure from the Commission and national authorities in the implementation process. 
Thus our hypothesis H2 is only partly supported. Administrative level makes a 
difference. Ministries are more involved in rule making than agencies, but the 
monitoring and implementation give a more mixed picture than we would expect.  
Contrary to our hypothesis on size (H3) the small size of the Icelandic administration 
seems not to make much difference except in that the extent of control and audit has 
increased within the Icelandic administration in the last five years and in that there have 
been changes in the existing rules and regulations or introduction of new rules within 
the administration (table 8). The small Icelandic administration is experiencing similar 
changes according to EU/EEA pressure as the other Nordic administrations. In other 
words, the small size of the Icelandic administration seems only to affect its capacity 
slightly concerning EU/EEA mattes and how it adapts in regulatory issues. 
Interestingly, the Icelandic central administration, according to these findings, seems to 
be experiencing similar pressure from the EU/EEA engagement and to be adapting to 
it in a similar faction despite being considerably smaller than the other Nordic 
administrations. This supports previous findings that the Icelandic administration is 
now fully capable of taking part in the EEA and would not have many difficulties in 
dealing with EU membership (Thorhallsson 2004). 
Summing up, structural features make a difference, but internal structure, measured 
by the distinction between ministerial departments and agency departments, seems to be 
more important than external structure, represented by the country’s form of affiliation 
to the European Union. In fact, internal structure makes a difference regarding all of 
our three perspectives; rule making, monitoring and enforcement. On the other hand, 
only on two of 11 indicators of regulatory activity are there significant variations 
between member countries and EEA countries. The small size of Iceland has limited 
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effect when it come to extent of new rules and increased control. As a result, our 
hypotheses are only partly supported: Regulatory activities are slightly more common in 
agencies than ministries though department levels clearly experience EU/EEA 
adaptation differently; the form of affiliation has some effect but much less than 
expected; the small size of the Icelandic administration is not such a limiting factor in 
coping with the adaptation process to EEA regulations.  
Table 8. Summary of regression equations by structural, cultural and environmental features affecting 
regulation. Standardized Beta coefficients. Linear Regression 
 Rule making Implementing and monitoring rules 
 Rule  
making  
as primary  
task  
New proce-
dures for 
control 
Extent of 
EU-rules 
Monitoring 
as primary 
task 
In-
creased 
control 
Workload 
on imple-
menting 
rules 
Autonomy in 
implementing 
rules 
Structure: 
Internal (level) 
External (member) 
Size (Iceland) 
 
-.08** 
 
-.04 
 
.04* 
-.03 
 
-.08** 
 
-.06** 
 
.05* 
-.03 
 
.04* 
 
-.11** 
 
.20** 
.10** 
 
.08** 
Culture: 
Adm. (East/West) 
Political (Finland) 
  
-.09** 
-.14** 
 
 
.05** 
 
-.05* 
 
 
-.01 
-.22** 
 
.14** 
 
Pressure form EU: 
Time (1998–2003) 
Policy Area 
Experience (Denm.) 
 
 
-.18** 
.05* 
 
 
-.12**  
 
-.08** 
.24** 
-.04* 
 
 
.04* 
-.12** 
 
 
 
 
-.14** 
 
- 
 
-.11** 
 
- 
-.09** 
Multiple R 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-statistics 
Significance of F 
.19 
.04 
.04 
24.008 
.000 
.23 
.05 
.05 
28.369 
.000 
.27 
.07 
.07 
28.117 
.000 
 
.15 
.02 
.02 
11.375 
.000 
30 
.09 
.09 
49.767 
.00 
.23 
.05 
.05 
19.603 
.000 
.12 
.02 
.01 
7.379 
.001 
**: Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level; -: Question not asked in 1998 
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Table 9. Summary of regression equations by structural, cultural and environmental features affecting 
enforcement and compliance of regulation. Standardized Beta coefficients. Linear Regression 
 Enforcement and compliance 
 Control from the 
Commission 
Control from national 
authorities 
Cases for national courts Cases for EU 
courts 
Structure: 
Internal (level) 
External (member) 
Size (Iceland) 
 
 
.23** 
-.02 
 
 
.05 
 
.14** 
 
.20** 
 
Culture: 
Adm. (East/West) 
Political (Finland) 
 
-.18** 
-.06 
 
-.16** 
-.11** 
 
.11** 
 
 
-.08* 
Pressure form EU: 
Time (1998–2003) 
Policy Area 
Experience 
(Denmark) 
 
- 
.19** 
a) 
 
- 
-.09** 
.06 
 
- 
.12** 
 
- 
.10** 
Multiple R 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-statistics 
Significance of F 
.31 
.10 
.09 
32.786 
.000 
.29 
.08 
.08 
34.529 
.000 
.19 
.04 
.03 
11.602 
.000 
.22 
.05 
.04 
17.298 
.000 
**: Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level; -: Question not asked in 1998. 
a) Denmark could not be included in this equation due to high intercorrelations, but a separate analyses 
with Denmark, policy area and Member/EEA shows a Beta .22** for Denmark. 
Culture  
The second perspective stressed the cultural-institutional perspective. We developed 
two cultural variables: the east Nordic administrative culture (in Finland and Sweden) versus 
the west Nordic administrative culture (in Iceland, Norway and Denmark) and the political and 
administrative engagement in European integration, i.e. that European engagement may 
affect central administrations’ responses to EU/EEA regulatory issues. We expected 
(H4) to find that the regulatory activity would be more extended in the West Model 
than in the East Model. Tables 8 and 9 show that central administrations in Finland and 
Sweden (the East Nordic Model) have experienced greater pressure from EU 
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membership than have administrations in the West Nordic Model. This is especially the 
case concerning the enforcement factors, i.e. control from the Commission and national 
authorities and cases brought to national courts. Also, the East Model countries 
experience greater workload on implementing rules and new procedures for control and 
to some extent monitoring as a primary task. Our hypothesis that the adaptation to EU 
regulations would be easier in the more integrated west Nordic model than in the east 
Nordic model with stronger and more independent central agencies seems to be partly 
supported. The high enforcement pressure indicate that the East Nordic model face 
some problems in adopting the EU-regulations. On the other side the West Nordic 
countries do not seem to be more integrated into the regulatory activities than the East 
Nordic Countries.  
This analysis is however complicated by the fact that the finish administrative model 
Finland is in between Sweden and the West Nordic countries. Adding to this, Finland, 
being the only Nordic state to be fully integrated into the EU framework, would 
presumably be most willing to adapt to EU regulatory pressure. This hypothesis (H5) 
stating that Finland, being more political and administrative engaged in the European 
project than the other states, will experience more changes in its regulatory activities 
than the others, seems to be supported by the empirical analyses. There is reported 
considerably more of increased control and audit in Finland in the last five years than in 
the other states. Also, a considerable number of new procedures for control have been 
established and Finland reports stronger EU-related control from national authorities. 
Furthermore, the data indicate that fewer Finish departments have experienced several 
cases under their jurisdiction being brought before the EU Court than the other EU 
member states. Accordingly, these findings may support our hypothesis that Finland’s 
political and administrative engagement influences its administrative experience in 
dealing with EU affairs. In other words, the willingness of Finland to become a good 
European as soon as possible is demonstrated in Finland’s increased control in 
monitoring EU regulations, i.e. setting up new procedures for control, and in not letting 
cases reach the EU Court, i.e. settling disputes in early stages.  
Summing up, administrative and political culture makes a difference both when it 
comes to rule making, monitoring and enforcement. There is a significant difference 
between Finland and the other countries on several dimensions, and also between 
countries representing the East Nordic and the West Nordic administrative model.  
EU pressure 
The third perspective describes the autonomy and control of departments primarily as a 
response to external pressure from the EU. We distinguished between three variables: 
Policy area, time, and experience. We expected to find that regulatory activities were more 
extended in policy areas within the internal market than in policy areas outside it. Also, 
we assumed that the Nordic states felt stronger regulatory pressure in 2003 than in 1998 
because of the ongoing integration process. Moreover, our hypothesis stated that length 
of membership, in terms of experience, matters: Denmark having adapted to European 
integration to a greater extent that the other states and thus not feeling as much EU 
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pressure in the last five years (particularly concerning rule enforcement). In other words, 
we expected other members to report stronger EU-related regulatory activity. 
Tables 8 and 9 show that policy area is a distinctive factor in determining the EU 
pressure giving strong support to hypothesis H6. Departments dealing with policy areas 
in the internal market experience considerably more pressure in all of our cases, except 
for workload on implementing rules, than departments dealing with other issues. In 
particular, they have introduced a greater number of new rules or changed the original 
rules and regulations and felt stronger control pressure from the Commission than the 
others.  
On the other hand, time (H7) is not such as an important factor as one could expect 
because of new phases of European integration. Generally, the Nordic states were not 
under a greater pressure from the EU in 2003 than they were in 1998, with two 
exceptions: The load of new EU-related rules was heavier in the period 1999–2003, than 
in the period 1994–1998 and monitoring as a primary task is somewhat more important 
in 2003 than in 1998. This being said, the importance of time could not be measured for 
some of the indicators, because the questions were not posed in 1998. This is the case 
for all indicators on enforcement and complaints and for two of the indicators on 
implementation and monitoring. To understand that weak effect of time we also have to 
take into consideration that in 1998 all countries except Denmark were in an 
introduction phase trying to adjust to all new laws and regulations following 
membership and EEA agreement. This pressure might have been weakened in 2003 but 
could have been succeeded by stronger integration in the years after 1998. 
Our hypothesis that Denmark is experiencing considerably less EU pressure because 
of its long engagement with European integration (H8) is supported by four features, 
two being for primary concern. First, Denmark is experiencing less control from the 
Commission than the other states. Second, Danish departments report less workload 
concerning implementing and enforcing EU decisions and regulations compared to 
other departments. On the other hand, one could argue that it is interesting that Danish 
departments, having been involved in the EU project for more than 30 years, are not 
more at ease with EU pressure than departments from the other states, which only 
joined the EU/EEA less than a decade ago.  
Summing up, policy area seems to be a decisive factor for understanding the 
variation in EU-related activity in the Nordic countries. This supports our hypothesis 
that the pressure from the EU is greater on the internal market areas than on the welfare 
areas and other areas. This makes a considerable difference in the regulatory behaviour 
in the domestic administrative apparatuses. In fact, the data indicate that there is a 
significant difference regarding policy areas in 10 out of 11 of our cases. In contrast, 
length of membership seems to make a less important difference and the same is the 
case when it comes to changes over time. 
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Conclusion: towards a transnational 
regulatory system  
We will discuss the conclusions of the study in three steps. First, we summarize the 
research and report the main findings of the empirical study. Then we will discuss the 
importance of having more than one theoretical perspective when it comes to 
explanations and interpretation of the findings. Finally, we will comment on the impact 
of EU regulation on the national regulatory systems. 
The empir ica l  f indings:  The development  
of  a  domest ic  regulatory  EU-
administrat ion 
In this paper we have shown, first, that the Nordic countries are indeed integrated into 
the European regulatory system of a considerable magnitude, despite the history of 
reluctance. This is especially the case when it comes to aspects related to rule making 
and transposition of rules, but less on implementation and enforcement of those rules. 
The research supports that the national administration in the Nordic countries has to 
some extent become a part of an «EU-administration» which is supposed to deliver 
efficient implementation of EU rules and regulations (Egeberg 2005a, Jacobsson, 
Lægreid and Pedersen 2003, Statskonsult 2005). We reveal a system in which increased 
integration of domestic administration into the EU has produced a set of administrative 
routines and practices in ministries and agencies to facilitate transposition, 
implementation and enforcement of EU rules and regulations (Christensen 2005). 
Departments report that they are considerably more involved in rule making than in 
implementation and monitoring concerning EU/EEA regulations. Interestingly, both 
Norway and Iceland report similar levels of activity as the other countries despite the 
fact that they are not members. All the countries seem to be less involved in compliance 
and enforcement than in monitoring and rule making, but Finland and Sweden report 
higher level of enforcement activity than the other countries. The reported pressure 
from external enforcement bodies is low in Denmark and it is worth noticing that there 
is considerably more pressure from external enforcement (EU/ESA) in Norway and 
Iceland than from national regulatory agencies. Overall this pattern supports the picture 
that the EU regulatory system is translated into compatibility with the existing traditions 
of Nordic central governments, representing a combination of robustness and flexibility 
in central government bodies (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004). 
Second, we were not able to explain much of the variance in the dependent variables, 
i.e. rule making, monitoring and enforcement. The formulated hypotheses based on the 
selected variables derived from the structural-instrumental perspective, the cultural-
institutional perspective, and external pressure from the EU generally do not get strong 
support in the empirical analysis. Some of the hypotheses do get stronger support than 
others. Nevertheless our data cannot explain much of the variance in the dependent 
variables.  
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Third, that said, there are some significant relationships related to variables derived 
from all three perspectives. Policy area is by far the most important single factor, an 
indication that the regulatory pressure from the EU is definitely stronger in the area of 
the internal market and free movement of people, capital, goods, and services than in 
other policy areas. This reflects that EU regulatory activities remain concentrated within 
the core of the common and internal market (Christensen 2005). Policy area has a 
significant impact on variation in 10 out of 11 indicators and has the strongest relative 
effect on 4 indicators. Policy area has particularly strong effect on rule making as a 
primary activity, changes in EU related rules over the past five years, activities and 
control from the EU-commission. But structural factors such as administrative level also 
make a significant difference in regulatory activities. Form of affiliation has an impact of 
some degree but size of the administration does not seem to have an effect. Cultural 
features also matter, such as the differences between an East Nordic and a West Nordic 
administrative culture when it comes to enforcement and compliance of regulation; and 
Finland’s EU-eagerness does indeed have a considerable effect on the adoption and 
enforcement of EU-regulatory activities. 
The data indicate that departments in Iceland and Norway are as affected by them as 
departments in the EU member states. Interestingly, the data indicate that the EU 
implementation pressure is similar on the EU outsiders as on the member states despite 
the reality that Norway and Iceland implement considerably fewer EU regulations than 
the member states. Form of affiliation only makes a difference in the cases of the EU 
member states experiencing greater pressure from EU/EEA regulatory agencies than do 
Iceland and Norway. They also experience more workload on implementing rules than 
the EU outsiders. EU membership results in a greater number of EU regulations being 
implemented but not in a considerable difference in adaptation of the central 
administration. In other words, all the central administrations of the EU/EEA member 
states feel the pressure of membership. Denmark, having had more than 30 years to 
adapt to EU membership, experienced similar EU pressure as the other states in the last 
five years. There are only two exceptions from this out of our eleven cases: Danish 
departments experienced less pressure from EU regulatory agencies and less workload 
than others.  
The importance of  b lending the  
perspect ives 
Thus, a lesson form this study is that there is no single-factor explanation for variation 
in regulatory activities. Accordingly, we need to blend different perspectives to explain 
the Nordic states’ involvement in the EU/EEA regulatory activity and to get a clearer 
picture of their activity regarding rule making, implementing, and enforcement of 
EU/EEA regulations (Christensen 2005, Kallestrup 2005, Beach 2005). What our study 
reveals is an interesting path dependent pattern in the development and impact of EU-
regulation in the Nordic countries. The impact of EU regulation is high, especially in the 
policy area of free trade and competitive markets, but it is not the only source of 
regulation. All countries are accountable and they report increased activities of 
 EUROPEANIZATION OF  NORDIC  CENTRAL  GOVERNMENTS:  … WORKING PAPER  10  -  2005  
 35 
transposition over time but similar activities on implementation. They experience less 
freedom and considerable pressure from EU. The increased role of agencies is 
supported but also more workload on ministries is revealed. The increased workload is 
somewhat more in the East Nordic countries than the West Nordic countries. This 
blend of perspectives also shows that the Nordic countries retain their character of 
consensus seeking, informal and pragmatic way of resolving issues. What we see is an 
interesting mixture of robustness and flexibility in the regulatory adaptation pattern 
(Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004).  
Towards a  t ransnat ional  regulatory  
system 
One of the characteristics of this study is that it goes beyond a state-centric approach to 
regulation and provides an opportunity to analyze regulatory activities from a trans-
national and multi-level perspective. What the study reveals, not surprisingly is that the 
increasing importance of the EU-regulation challenges the concept of the Regulatory 
State by blurring the boundaries of competence and by adding new dimensions to 
regulatory policy. Regulation nowadays includes not only regulation by the state or 
within domestic government but also regulation by organizations outside the state. The 
increased autonomization and Europeanization of the regulatory agencies might 
enhance multiple identities and make them double-hatted by enforcing EU laws in 
direct interaction with the European commission while they at the same time perform 
traditional regulatory tasks as agents for domestic governments (Egeberg 2005b). The 
parallel development of autonomous regulatory agencies in the EU and in the member 
states might create a direct link between regulatory agencies at different levels, thus 
bypassing the domestic ministerial structure (Egeberg 2004). This development, in 
which regulation seems to be on the increase but not necessarily directly by the state, 
indicates that we are heading toward a transnational regulatory state in which the border 
between national regulation and EU regulation tends to fade away. This might improve 
the regulatory implementation efficiency but might also increase the problems of 
political accountability, control and legitimacy. 
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Appendix:  Independent  var iables  
S t r u c t u r a l  f e a t u r e s :  
Table A1. Administrative level. Percentages 
1. Ministries 24 
2. Agencies 76 
N=100% 2689 
Table A2. Form of affiliation. Percentages 
1. Member state (Finland, Denmark,Sweden) 71 
2. EEA states (Norway Iceland) 29 
N=100% 2729 
Table A3. Size of the administration. Percentages 
1.Small (Iceland) 8 
2. Big (Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden) 92 
N=100% 2729 
C u l t u r a l  f e a t u r e s :  
Table A4. Administrative models. Percentages 
1. East Nordic (Sweden, Finland) 44 
2. West Nordic (Denmark, Norway Iceland) 56 
N=100% 2729 
Table A5. EU- eagerness. Percetnages 
1. Eager (Finland) 17 
2. Reluctant (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway) 83 
N=100% 2729 
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E n v i r o n m e n t a l  E U  f e a t u r e s :  
Table A6. Time. Percentages 
1. 1998 52 
2. 2003 48 
N=100% 2729 
Table A7. Experience. Percentages 
1. Long (Denmark) 26 
2. Short (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland 74 
N=100% 2729 
Table A6. Policy area. Percentages 
1. Business/market/environment: (Agriculture, Fishery, Transport, Environment, 
Trade, Industry, Energy, Finance, Labour) 
53 
2. Other (Health, Research, Education, Culture, Social affairs, Defence, Justice, 
Foreign affairs, Domestic, Prime Minister’s office) 
47 
N=100% 2729 
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2‐2005  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Modalen: Fra off‐road til on‐line på 25 år». Mai 2005. 
3‐2005  Nanna Kildal: «Fra arbeidsbegrepets historie: Aristoteles til Marx». Mai 2005. 
4‐2005  Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness and Kristin Rubecksen: «Autonomy and Control in the Norwegian 
Civil Service: Does Agency Form Matter?». September 2005. 
5‐2005  Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness and Kristin Rubecksen: «Regulating Regulatory Organizations: 
Controlling Norwegian Civil Service Organizations». September 2005. 
6‐2005  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Regulatory Reforms and Agencification». November 2005. 
7‐2005  Anne Lise Fimreite and Per Lægreid: «Specialization and Coordination: Implications for 
Integration and Autonomy in a Multi‐Level System». November 2005. 
8‐2005  Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness and Kristin Rubecksen: «Performance Management in Practice – 
The Norwegian Way». November 2005. 
9‐2005  Stig Helleren: «Omstilling i Arbeidstilsynet: Tilsynsmeldingens konsekvenser for strategi og 
organisering». November 2005. 
10‐2005  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Nordic 
Central Governments: Towards a Transnational Regulatory State?». November 2005. 
2004 
1‐2004  Dag  Olaf  Torjesen  and  Hallgeir  Gammelsæter:  «Management  Between  Autonomy  and 
Transparency in the Enterprise Hospital». January 2004.  
2‐2004  Haldor Byrkjeflot and Simon Neby: «The Decentralized Path Challenged? Nordic Health Care 
Reforms in Comparison». January 2004.  
3‐2004  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «The  Fragmented  State  –  the Challenges  of Combining 
Efficiency, Institutional Norms and Democracy». March 2004. 
4‐2004  Morten Dyrdal: «Europeisering av tilsynsmyndigheter i Norge og Sverige». Mars 2004. 
5‐2004  Karsten  Vrangbæk  and  Katarina  Østergren:  «The  Introduction  of  Choice  in  Scandinavian 
Hospital Systems. Arguments and Policy Processes in the Danish and the Norwegian Case». 
March 2004.  
6‐2004  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Internationalization  at  Norwegian  Universities  and  Colleges  after  the 
Quality Reform». April 2004. The Globalization Program. 
7‐2004  Hans‐Tore  Hansen,  Anne  Hege  Trædal‐Henden,  Olaf  Jürgens  and  Wolfgang  Voges:  «Poverty 
among Households with Children: A Comparative Study of Lone Parents and Couples with 
Children in Norway and Germany». April 2004. 
8‐2004  Renate  Storetvedt  Lien  og  Arnhild  Taksdal  «Integrering  av  kjønnsperspektiv  i  offentlig 
tjenesteproduksjon og planlegging». Mai 2004. 
9‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy  og Synnøve Serigstad: «Tilsyn  som  styringsform  i  forholdet mellom  staten og 
kommunene». Mai 2004. 
10‐2004  Morten Dyrdal: «Legemiddeltilsyn og europeisering». September 2004. 
11‐2004  Bodil  Ravneberg:  «Økonomiske  insentiv  i  arbeidslinjen,  virker  det?  Evaluering  av 
forsøksordning med kvalifiseringsstønad i ’Prosjektet Amalie’ i Åsane». Oktober 2004. 
12‐2004  Per  Lægreid  and  Synnøve  Serigstad:  «Organizing  for  Homeland  Security:  The  Case  of 
Norway». November 2004. 
13‐2004  Ivar Bleiklie: «Institutional Conditions and  the Responsibilities of Universities». November 
2004. 
14‐2004  Lise Hellebø: «Food Safety at Stake – the Establishment of Food Agencies». November 2004. 
15‐2004  Katarina  Østergren:  «The  Institutional  Construction  of  Consumerism.  A  Study  of 
Implementing Quality Indicators». November 2004.  
16‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy and Anne Homme: «Governance  in Primary and Lower Secondary Education. 
Comparing Norway, Sweden and England». November 2004. 
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17‐2004  Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid and  Inger Marie Stigen: «Performance Management and Public 
Sector Reform: The Norwegian Hospial Reform». December 2004. 
18‐2004  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Regulatory  Agencies  −  The  Challenges  of  Balancing 
Agency Autonomy and Political Control». December 2004. 
19‐2004  Dag  Arne  Christensen:  «Velferdsstat,  rettighetslovgivning  og  lokalt  selvstyre».  Desember 
2004. 
20‐2004  Kristin  Rubecksen:  «Civil  Service  Organizations  in  Norway:  Organizational  Features  and 
Tasks». December 2004. 
21‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «National  Versus  International 
Mergers in Unionised Oligopoly». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2004  Birte Folgerø  Johannessen: «Ledelse og evidens  i det psykiske helsevernet, konsekvenser  for 
kunnskapsforståelse og organisering». Desember 2004. 
23‐2004  Jacob Aars og Svein Kvalvåg: «Politiske uttrykksformer i en bykontekst». Desember 2004. 
24‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy: «Active Ageing in the Labour Market. Country Report − Norway». December 
2004. 
25‐2004  Torgeir Sveri: «Strukturer og reformer. En kvalitativ analyse av reformen  ’Enhetlig  ledelse’ 
sett i lys av sykehusets arbeidsorganisering». Desember 2004. 
26‐2004  Stig Helleren: «Arbeidstilsynets rollekonflikt: Vekslende tilsynsstrategier mellom kontroll og 
veiledning». Desember 2004. 
27‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Odd  Rune  Straume:  «Globalisation  and  Union 
Opposition to Technological Change». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
28‐2004  Frode  Meland:  «A  Union  Bashing  Model  of  Inflation  Targeting».  December  2004.  The 
Globalization Program. 
2003 
1‐2003  Tom Christensen og Per Lægreid: «Politisk styring og privatisering: holdninger i elitene og 
befolkningen». Mars 2003. 
2‐2003  Ivar Bleiklie, Per Lægreid and Marjoleine H. Wik: «Changing Government Control in Norway: 
High Civil Service, Universities and Prisons». March 2003. 
3‐2003  Badi H. Baltagi, Espen Bratberg and Tor Helge Holmås: «A Panel Data Study of Physiciansʹ 
Labor Supply: The Case of Norway». March 2003. HEB. 
4‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Unionised  Oligopoly,  Trade 
Liberalisation and Location Choice». March 2003. The Globalization Program. 
5‐2003  Lise Hellebø: «Nordic Alcohol Policy and Globalization as a Changing Force». April 2003. 
6‐2003  Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynsroller i samferdselssektoren». April 2003. 
7‐2003  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Trust  in  Government  –  the  Significance  of  Attitudes 
Towards Democracy, the Public Sector and Public Sector Reforms». April 2003. 
8‐2003  Rune Ervik: «Global Normative Standards and National Solutions for Pension Provision: The 
World Bank, ILO, Norway and South Africa  in Comparative Perspective». April 2003. The 
Globalization Program. 
9‐2003  Nanna Kildal: «The Welfare State: Three Normative Tensions». Mai 2003. 
10‐2003  Simon Neby: «Politisk styring og institusjonell autonomi – tre illustrasjoner». Mai 2003. 
11‐2003  Nina  Berven:  «Cross  National  Comparison  and  National  Contexts:  Is  what  we  Compare 
Comparable?». July 2003. The Globalization Program. 
12‐2003  Hilde  Hatleskog  Zeiner:  «Kontrollhensyn  og  kontrollpraksis.  En  studie  av  Food  and 
Veterinary Office (FVO)». August 2003. 
13‐2003 Nanna Kildal: «Perspectives on Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD». August 2003. 
14‐2003 Erik Allardt: «Two Lectures: Stein Rokkan and the Twentieth Century Social Science». «Den 
sociala rapporteringens tidstypiska förankring». September 2003. 
15‐2003  Ilcheong  Yi:  «The  National  Patterns  of  Unemployment  Policies  in  Two  Asian  Countries: 
Malaysia and South Korea». September 2003. The Globalization Program. 
16‐2003 Dag Arne Christensen: «Active Ageing: Country Report Norway». November 2003. 
17‐2003 Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynspolitikk i Norge: Utflytting og autonomi». November 2003. 
18‐2003  Dag Arne Christensen, Rune Ervik and Ingrid Helgøy: «The Impact of Institutional Legacies on 
Active Ageing Policies: Norway and UK as Contrasting Cases». December 2003. 
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19‐2003  Ole  Frithjof Norheim  og  Benedicte  Carlsen:  «Legens  doble  rolle  som  advokat  og  portvakt  i 
Fastlegeordningen. Evaluering av fastlegeordningen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
20‐2003  Kurt R. Brekke og Odd Rune Straume: «Pris‐ og avanseregulering  i  legemiddelmarkedet. En 
prinsipiell diskusjon og en vurdering av den norske modellen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
21‐2003  Per Lægreid, Vidar W. Rolland, Paul G. Roness and John‐Erik Ågotnes: «The Structural Anatomy 
of the Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar  Bleiklie, Haldor  Byrkjeflot  and  Katarina Östergren:  «Taking  Power  from Knowledge. A 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM.  
23‐2003  Per  Lægreid,  Ståle  Opedal  and  Inger  Marie  Stigen:  «The  Norwegian  Hospital  Reform  – 
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
24‐2003  Håkon  Høst:  «Kompetansemåling  eller  voksenutdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene? 
Underveisrapport fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Downstream  merger  with 
upstream market power». The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel: «Two Lectures: The Concept of Competence – an Instrument of Social and 
Political Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the 
Italian Case». December 2003. 
2002 
1‐2002  Håkon  Høst:  «Lærlingeordning  eller  skolebasert  utdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene?». 
April 2002. 
2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre  Breivik,  Hilde  Haualand  and  Per  Solvang:  «Rome  –  a  Temporary  Deaf  City! 
Deaflympics 2001». June 2002. 
3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 
2001». Juni 2002. 
4‐2002  Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 
2002. 
5‐2002  Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen: «Fritt  sykehusvalg. En  teoretisk  analyse  av konkurranse  i det 
norske sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud:  «Mål‐  og  resultatstyring  gjennom  statlige  budsjettreformer».  Juli 
2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske 
argument og empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik:  «Mangfold  eller konformitet? Likheter og  forskjeller  innenfor og 
mellom fem statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway 
and the United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September 
2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14‐2002  Atle  Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap.  Verdsflukt  og 
verdsherredømme». September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Complex  Patterns  of  Interaction  and  Influence Among 
Political and Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education 
Systems». Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration:  Effects  of  the  EU  on  the  Central  Administration  in  the  Nordic  States». 
November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19‐2002  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen  i  Norge  etter  1975».  November  2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
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20‐2002  Augustín José Menéndez m.fl.: «Taxing Europe. The Case for European Taxes in Federal 
Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital 
Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. 
Tre innlegg». Desember 2002.  
24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i 
Bergen og Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering 
av økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen: «Hovedtyper av valgordninger. Proporsjonalitet eller politisk 
styring?». Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi and Tor Helge Holmås: «Will Increased Wages Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Teknologi og demokrati. Med norske kommuner på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob Aars: «Byfolk og politikk. Gjennomgang av data fra en befolkningsundersøkelse i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
 
 
